The theme of this paper is the microeconomics of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS) over the period 1950-2000. The key structural change in this region is the end of the socialist regime in 1989 and 1992, and the subsequent attempt at transition to a market economy. Consequently, the focus of analysis will necessarily be on the nature of the growth process in the transition, and how microeconomic agents a¤ect that process.
Introduction
The theme of this paper is the microeconomics of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS) over the period . In this region, however, there is a marked structural change that results from the end of the socialist regime in 1989 and 1992, and the subsequent attempt at transition to a market economy. Consequently, the focus of analysis will necessarily be on the nature of the growth process in the transition.
Although there is considerable variation in growth performance within the subregions of CEE and NIS, it is apparent from the data that the primary di¤erence is across these two regions. Especially with regard to economic restructuring of enterprises, the CEE and NIS look very di¤erent.
This paper studies the behavioral responses to constraints that arise in relation to the major actors in transition economies: households and enterprises. The key aspect of the process is economic restructuring in enterprises, and we focus on the factors that induce and inhibit it.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews the most important features of growth before the transition. In Section 3, we discuss the key legacies that the transition economies inherited from the Soviet growth model. Section 4 sets out possible microeconomic components of economic growth in transition economies, namely, the restructuring of existing …rms' and new …rm formation as well as households saving and labor supply decisions. Section 5 discusses the behavior of households. Section 6 studies …rm restructuring and Section 7 looks at new …rm formation. Section 8 concludes.
The Soviet Growth Model
The Soviet-type economic system was designed to achieve rapid economic growth. The Soviet Growth Model was applied in various forms in all the socialist economies.
The SGM was e¤ective, ignoring the cost, at rapidly industrializing the Soviet economy. A predominantly agricultural economy became, in less than three generations, an industrial power, at least when measured by gross production of autos, cement, oil, and steel. Over time, however, the performance of the SGM began to steadily decline. Growth rates of output per worker decreased from 5.8% from 1950-59 to 2.1% in the 1970's and 1.4% in the 1990's. This was due to a noticeable deterioration in productivity growth, which turned negative in the 1960's and remained so till the end of the regime. 2 It is important for our purposes to consider the defects of the SGM. The key defect is that output growth is pursued without regard for the opportunity cost of that growth. Consequently, resources are used beyond the point at which they make a positive net contribution to the economy. Because planners used resources to maximize the growth rate of production it is perhaps not surprising that this led to ecologic disaster. As Feschbach and Friendly argue:
In the last decade of the 20th century, there are no leading industrial cities in the Soviet Union where air pollution is not shortening 2 There is an important question of interpretation involved here. If one assumes that labor and capital could be freely substituted, then estimates of total factor productivity are as stated in the text. If one assumes, following Weitzman, that such substitution is costly, then total factor productivity does not become negative. Rather the slowdown in Soviet growth is explained by more rapid growth of capital inputs compared with labor, resulting in reduced output growth due to the inability to substitute inputs. Much debate has centered on which interpretation is correct [see [50] , for example], but both explanations are consistent with the defects we discuss. the life expectancy of adults and undermining the health of their children. The growth that made the USSR a superpower has been so ill-managed, so greedy in its exploitation of natural resources and so indi¤erent to the health of its people, that ecocide is inevitable [20] .
Another fundamental defect of the SGM is that the return to capital is independent of other decisions. In particular, the model assumes that output is independent of labor's share. 3 Presumably, the amount of consumption will a¤ect the supply (and quality) of labor e¤ort. Any such feedback, however, is assumed away in the model. So the key to industrialization is seen in the growth of heavy industry. Now this model may have been e¤ective when the level of terror was high. As socialism develops, however, it becomes more and more di¢cult to maintain such forced industrialization. Consumption cannot be deferred. But when growth is not achieved through forced industrialization it must be achieved through intensive means, primarily via technical change. This the Soviet economy was ill-suited for; instead the SGM fell victim to the extensive growth trap.
The extensive growth trap arises because over time it becomes more and more di¢cult to mobilize resources. Extensive growth requires high input growth. In the early stages of industrialization high input growth can be achieved by shifting labor from traditional sectors, e.g., the countryside, to the modern sector. High growth in the labor force can be achieved by moving people from agriculture to industry. But as this reserve is used up, labor force participation reaches an upper limit. After that, labor force growth is constrained by fertility. One can still accumulate capital at a high rate, but now the capital-labor ratio will rise, and if this causes the marginal product of capital to fall, then the growth of output will lag. 4 This is the extensive growth trap. 5 3 This is strictly true for the Fel'dman-Mahalanobis model, but not for the SGM, for as we have seen labor supply is taken to depend on the supply of consumer goods in that model. 4 Ignoring growth in technical progress (since we are considering extensive growth), per-capita output growth can be written as dy y = F k k y dk k where y is per-capita output, k is capital per worker, and F k is the marginal product of capital. Extensive growth means that the capital-output ratio is increasing with growth in k: The e¤ect of this on growth thus depends on what happens to F k . The key issue is whether the marginal product of capital decreases faster than the capital's share in income increases. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, then the marginal product of capital will fall rapidly as capital is substituted for labor. 5 To see the problem with sustained extensive growth, note that
, where I is investment, Y is output, and K is the capital stock. Extensive growth implies that capital grows faster than income, so Y K must be decreasing over time. Thus for constant growth rates of the capital stock the investment-output ratio must rise continuously. Of course, the problem is not quite That the Soviet economy was stuck in the extensive growth trap was recognized by the leadership rather early. Discussion of how to accelerate technical progress, so that growth could be achieved intensively was discussed often (even by Malenkov). The problem is that the system was not designed to support innovation (e.g., [3] and [15] ). There are a myriad of reasons for this. Paramount is the emphasis on current plan ful…llment that is endemic in planned economies. The "virtuous haste" that characterizes Soviet planning imposes costs on potential innovators who would sacri…ce current production for future gains. This is critical because the gains from innovation are taxed away by the dynamic incentives problem, the ratchet e¤ect, that plagues these economies. In this environment innovation is deterred.
An important question is why it proved so di¢cult to escape the extensive growth trap. One explanation, of course, is that in a STE there is no self-correcting mechanism, as in a market economy. 6 In a market economy if investments are earning inadequate rates of return, investment goes elsewhere. In the STE, however, investment continued to go into activities where the rates of return were very low. This of course points to a fundamental problem with planned economies, the absence of a market for capital. Of course one of the key points about socialism was precisely to eliminate private ownership of capital.
One might also be tempted to ask why the elasticity of substitution was so low in the STE? This is also a rather deep question, one that points to the heart of the mechanism. To some extent it is due to the inability to substitute capital for labor in a functional sense. That is, the enterprise does not shed labor, it just under-employs it, due to an over-full employment system. 7 In STE's the enterprise always wants to hoard as much labor as possible, as a reserve against taut plans. Moreover, enterprises always want to add capital to raise capacity. So additions to the capital stock were utilized ine¢ciently due to lack of incentives to use inputs in a cost-minimizing manner. More importantly, however, there was a built-in input-output conservatism under planning. Plans were based on previous that stark, because as an economy develops the relative price of investment goods decreases over time. So some accumulation of machines can occur without I Y rising due to the relative price adjustment. But once this price change has been absorbed, further extensive growth can only take place by devoting higher and higher proportions of income for investment. Thus the ration of I Y stood at around 14% in 1950, rising to 33% by 1980. Nonetheless growth rates of per-capita income declined during this period (See [50] )
One may avoid the perils of the extensive growth trap if the economy learns to use capital more e¤ectively over time. Perhaps this is what happens in the NIC's. 6 This is perhaps a key di¤erence between the Soviet Union and the NIC's. In the NIC's the market may prevent investment from ‡owing to uses where the marginal product of capital is declining. 7 There is some question whether this was due to soft-budget constraints (Kornai) or a planning commitment to full employment (Granick).
plans, and this tended to inhibit substitution as well.
A second explanation focuses on the absence of organizational innovation. Capital is simply poured into existing enterprises; there are no entrepreneurs who are able to re-organize the production process. In STE's enterprises enter but do not exit ( [31] ). Ine¢cient enterprises may contract but they do not cease operation. In market economies an important source of productivity growth is the churning of …rms as …rms expand, contract, enter, and exit. This causes inputs to ‡ow to higher valued uses. In STE's this process is absent, with major consequences for the growth of factor productivity.
The fundamental point is that while STE's managed to invest increasingly greater shares of income, 8 the investments were of poor quality because of the informational problems in the economy and the lack of incentives for e¢cient investment. The public was forced (savings were not voluntary, of course) to postpone consumption for the future, but these resources were invested so poorly that no positive return was earned.
The legacy of extensive growth, without reallocation, is that Soviet industry was dominated by over-manned enterprises with ine¢ciently allocated capital. Under planning capital was rarely, if ever, reallocated to alternative uses, due to the absence of exit, and the exigencies of the planning system. In transition economies the problem is the absence of markets for capital. The problem is that in order for capital to be reallocated there must be an owner. The absence of property rights makes it di¢cult to transfer capital assets. 9 Thus even after transition begins the capital stock is rather rigid.
Note that extensive growth also meant that enterprises used resources inef…ciently. Energy was underpriced and over-utilized. The same is true for other primary commodities. The implication of this is that when prices are liberalized many industries are producing negative value added: the value of output is less than the value of the inputs used in production. 10 This is fundamentally a pricing problem. In particular, when the cost of capital is not accounted for, it will be invested in ine¢cient ways. We will discuss the implications when we come to 8 CIA recalculations of Soviet national income show the capital-output ratio rising four-fold between 1928 and 1987, while o¢cial data shows it almost tripling between 1958 and 1987. To accomplish this the Soviets had to continually increase the share of investment in national income; thus this share doubled between 1950 and 1975. See [50] . 9 Notice that this is also true for leasing. Clearly it would be advantageous to have leasing. It would allow capital to be reallocated without ownership change. The problem, however, is that without ownership leasing is impossible, since possession in this case is 100% of the deal. The absence of property rights makes the allocation of capital rigid. 10 In 1935 Hayek had already noted that: "The best tractor factory may not be an asset, and the capital invested in it is a sheer loss, if the labour which the tractor replaces is cheaper than the cost of the material and labour which goes to make a tractor, plus interest". economic transition.
Key Legacies from Soviet Period
The legacy of the Soviet experience is that of an ine¢cient economic system. These ine¢ciencies are myriad, but we can consider three main types: those that are internal to organizations; those that are external in the sense of misallocation of resources, and; those that are dynamic.
Internal versus External Ine¢ciency Internal ine¢ciency arises primarily from the lack of high-powered incentives in STE's. Enterprises primary responsibility was plan ful…llment not pro…t maximization. Enterprise directors that were successful were those that found ways to ful…ll the plan. Producing a better mousetrap, or …nding a method of producing a mousetrap at a lower cost was not rewarded.
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The emphasis on plan ful…llment came at the expense of cost minimization. Reducing costs was not important to the director of a Soviet enterprise. This could risk plan ful…llment, and any gains would be taxed away anyway.
Many observers emphasize internal ine¢ciencies when thinking about transition. This is re ‡ected in the view that the primary problem of transition is to get new owners who are more suited to the market economy. Privatization will alter the incentives that enterprises face, and lead to substitution of better managers.
Dynamic Ine¢ciency: Di¢culties with Innovation The ine¢ciencies in resource allocation were endemic to the Soviet system, but they were tolerated as long as the rate of economic growth remained high. Deteriorating economic performance is a di¤erent matter. Slowdowns in the rate of growth struck at the very heart of the SGM. Moreover, a shrinking pie increased the cost of poor resource allocation. Thus the deterioration in the growth performance of the economy struck at the very core of the system. We discussed earlier the competing explanations for deteriorating economic performance: declining rates of growth of technical change versus a low elasticity of substitution. It is important to understand that these two explanations can be somewhat reconciled. A declining rate of TFP could be the result of sub-optimal investment policies as well as due to low returns from R&D. Similarly, a declining marginal productivity of capital can arise from the low-quality R&D, just as it could be due to inferior investment policy. Thus, from the perspective of the underlying phenomena the two competing explanations may result from the same 11 Indeed, the system biased against such e¤orts, as any gains would be taxed away via the ratchet, while the costs of achieving such gains would fall on the director.
source. What was missing in the Soviet economy was the ability to generate practical new ideas, and more importantly, to translate them into practice. Innovation was a problem; innovation adoption was a more severe problem.
One aspect of this was the static nature of organization. Innovation often takes the form of new organizations splitting o¤ from old ones. Organizational innovation accompanies technological innovation. New …rms need new space, new workers, etc. In the STE this was impossible. Groups of workers could not form new establishment; all entry is from above. 12 Moreover, recall that an STE is supply constrained, so that there are no free resources available to start up new entities. This means that any new activity is costly in terms of other activities foregone; especially so to the planners.
The idea of going from extensive to intensive growth ought to be straightforward. Instead of producing machines to produce machines, produce machines to produce autos. In practice, of course, it is more tricky. Notice that in principle there are two main ways to grow intensively: …rst, by using existing capital more e¢ciently, and; second, by modernization, a shift towards sectors where there is greater technical progress. For example, there was the idea to move into electronics and other high-tech industries. In most STE's it was the second variant that was chosen; choosing the …rst, while highly productive, would require serious reform.
The problem with modernization is that it did not reduce the emphasis on traditional industry. Heavy industry retained its priority also. As we have noted, extensive growth was energy intensive.
The major problem with modernization, however, was the di¢culty of translating innovation into practice. Here the ratchet e¤ect, among other problems, conspired to make this di¢cult. The ratchet e¤ect reduces the incentive to innovate. Why? Because any gains that are obtained from innovation are taxed away through higher plan targets. Notice that the enterprise bears all the risk of innovation but loses the bene…ts due to the ratchet. Hence, enterprises preferred to add capital but not innovate. This is the reason why the di¤usion of innovations in the STE was so slow. It is interesting to note that while Stalin was alive, and hence the costs of failing to adopt innovations were higher, di¤usion was more rapid than in later periods.
Industrial Concentration
The industrial structure the transition countries inherited from the Soviet system has important characteristics that a¤ect transition: an emphasis on size and an absence of small enterprises. Stalinist planners emphasized gigantic plants, known as gigantomania.
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Soviet plants were often extremely large. One reason for this is that Soviet enterprises tended to be located in a single area, whereas large western companies tend to have plants dispersed geographically. This tendency has led to signi…cant geographical concentration of industry. The Russian economy is much more regionally specialized than western economies, including the United States.
While the extent to which enterprises in the Soviet Union were excessive in size has often been exaggerated in the literature, 14 what is critical is that small enterprises were missing from the Soviet landscape. It is interesting to compare the size distribution of industry in Russia with that of the Unites States. 15 In the latter most employment is concentrated in small …rms (less than 250 workers) or in very large …rms (greater than 10,000 workers). These enterprises comprised two-thirds of industrial employment in the US compared with only 25% in Russia. Russia has both less extra large …rms and less small …rms. Most striking is the di¤erence with respect to small …rms, where in Russia 91.5 percent of civilian employment and an estimated 94.5 percent of total (i.e., including defense) employment in manufacturing is provided by enterprises with employment of 250 or greater, while only 73.1 percent of US. manufacturing employment is provided by similar …rms.
The lack of small enterprises in the Soviet economy no doubt was an important factor inhibiting innovation and technical change. New ideas often are developed in new …rms, and most new …rms start out small. The absence of the dynamism created by small …rms may be an important element in the deterioration of performance in the Soviet economy.
In addition to the absence of small …rms in the Soviet economy it is usually asserted that Russia su¤ers from a monopoly problem. This is less of a problem than is usually recognized, however. As is shown in [9] , Russian industry is not that highly concentrated. 16 While Russia has many concentrated industries these tend to be small and account for a small proportion of employment. Most employment takes place in sectors that are not highly concentrated.
What is important about Russian industrial structure, however, is that potential competition is inhibited by poor transportation infrastructure. This section follows [9] . The comparison is made using the 1987 census of manufacturing for the US, and the 1989 Soviet census of industry for Russia. 16 Where highly concentrated is taken, for example, to be a four-…rm concentration ratio in excess of 60%. 17 As the authors of the IMF-World Bank-OECD-EBRD joint study on the Soviet economy argued: "Even where more than one enterprise exists, the national aggregates hide a high is, after all, a very large country, and the transportation and distribution system inherited from the Soviet period was not designed to create national markets. Moreover, the underdevelopment of the …nancial and legal system serve as entry barriers. These supporting institutions (distribution, …nance, law, and transportation) may much more important to developing competition as any technological barriers (i.e., economies of scale). Although the potential for competition to develop through changing product lines and new entry appears signi…cant, the inadequacy of these supporting institutions may prove to be an signi…cant barrier to e¤ective competition for years to come.
Certaintly, these problems impact both NIS and CEE. The CEE economies are a¤ected to a much lesser extent. One simple reason is geography. CEE is closer to Western Europe and is more likely to have acces to export markets. More open economies su¤er less from a monopolistic industrial structure.
Microeconomics of Growth in a Transition Process

The microeconomic challenges of economic transition
One of the lessons from the transition experience in NIS countries is that the price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, open trade and privatization may not be su¢cient for a successful transition. The inherited legacies may slow down the development of market institutions which in turn may prevent microeconomic agents from adopting the economic incentives of a market economy. The microeconomic agents that act in a transition economy are …rms and households. 18 Economic development requires that households save and accumulate human capital and supply labor and capital to the emerging …rms. The transition is however somewhat di¤erent, since the economy has already been industrialized. 19 The labor force has accumulated many of the necessary technical skills associated with industrialization, and the physical assets are in place. Moreover, …rms already exist that resemble modern …rms in capitalist economies. Therefore the problems are slightly di¤erent. 20 Many of the most critical issues in transition center around getting appropriate institutions for a market economy.
The basic microeconomic decisions that households make in transition are the degree of regional monopoly power that is protected by generally poor communications and transportation and by administered marketing channels which, in turn, are insulated from one another by ministerial lines of responsibility" [36, 16] . 18 It is tempting to consider local governments as microeconomic agents, too, as a large part of recent literature does. Below, we will refer to the role of local governments speci…cally. 19 The few exceptions of Albania, Romania and some Central Asian countries still have many more large industrial enterprises than a typical developing economy. same problems dealt with elsewhere: households choose how much to save and in which …rms to work; they also may choose to become entrepreneurs and establish new business; existing …rms make decisions about restructuring, choices that concern changing both inputs and outputs, and including the size and composition of their workforce.
Di¤erences in the two sub-regimes
A critical focus in this paper is to understand the di¤erence in microeconomic response, primarily with regard to restructuring, in CEE and NIS. A rough generalization that we will make is that in the CEE's behavior has responded to changes in the incentives system in a manner consistent with what might be expected from standard analysis. In the NIS, on the other hand, institutional and behavioral adaptation has taken place to circumvent the need to change. One hypothesis is that this is due to the di¤ering legacies from the socialist period in the two regions; especially in terms of competitiveness. It may also be due to increased openness of the CEE's due to geography. 21 Certainly, there is no clear dividing line between CEE and NIS. The most successful CEE countries are Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland but even within them there are large regional di¤erences. The performance of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that used to be a part of Soviet Union is much more similar to that of CEE than other NIS (this is may be due to the fact that they joined the USSR only in 1939). In the former Soviet Union, there is also a huge degree of heterogeneity. Even within Russia there are regions that are doing really well even by the CEE standards.
Despite all these variations, in the analysis below we will refer to 'typical' CEE and NIS transition experiences as if those two sub-regimes were clearly de…ned. The two extremes we will have in mind are the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and Russia/Ukraine.
Households
Savings behavior
Under socialism most savings were public savings -the pro…ts of socialist enterprises and indirect taxation. Household savings was primarily a response to shortages. 22 Capital accumulation under socialism was quite high; the problem was the low e¢ciency of investment. Many STE's achieved investment rates of 21 Consistent with the di¤ering responses of the Baltics and Kirghizia. 22 See [32] for a survey of savings in socialist economies. over 30% of GDP, consistent with the extensive growth strategy that was pursued [50] . These high savings rates were easy to achieve given the controls available under planning.
Transition alters the very nature of savings. The rate of capital accumulation is no longer a planning decision. Because consumption was kept arti…cially low under planning it is not surprising that one initial impact of transition was to see declines in savings rates across the regions. Savings rates in the CEE's averaged around 17 to 18 percent in the mid-1990's, while in the NIS these rates were generally in the low 20% range [59] . 23 Presumably this re ‡ected an increase in welfare as a constraint on household choice was lifted. It should be noted, however, that in addition the uncertain environment of early transition a¤orded poor opportunities for savings aside from capital ‡ight.
With transition the locus of savings moves towards the private sector. 24 Enterprises retain earnings in order to invest, and households save in order to provide for future consumption. An important source of motivation for household savings is the increased risk associated with income streams in the post-socialist environment, combined with weak institutions to accomplish consumption smoothing (aside from intra-family transfers). 25 The shock of transition led to the destruction of household savings in many transition economies. This was the result of o¢cial price in ‡ation combined with interest-rate ceilings that destroyed the real value of savings. Hence, households found themselves at the start of transition with asset stocks below their desired levels. One might suppose that this would lead to increased savings in order to rebuild these stocks. In addition, the increased uncertainty associated with transition as well as inability to borrow in case of negative income shocks might also cause households to increase their target levels of asset stocks.
Although there are good reasons to expect desired savings to increase in transition, the fact that previous savings was wiped out presumably had an adverse e¤ect on the form that these savings would take. At least in the early stages of transition households were reluctant to trust domestic savings institutions and domestic assets. Savings took the form of holding foreign currency. Savings held in this form are less easily transformed into investments and therefore less useful for growth purposes. 23 Though signi…cantly higher in Russia, where personal savings rates were quite high. 24 Although governments still have an impact on total savings via public sector de…cits. 25 See [12] for evidence from developing economies about how access to assets for consumption smoothing lowers savings rates.
Intra-family transfers
Transition has been associated with sharp declines in (at least apparent) real incomes in all countries. Unemployment also became an open phenomenon. Meanwhile, the real bene…ts to recipients of social transfers also declined sharply. Transition governments typically lack the capacity to protect all those made vulnerable by transition. The consequences for the population thus depends, to a large extent, on the degree to which intra-family transfers can compensate for the absence of public transfers.
The importance of transfers in transition is enhanced by the lack of trust in …nancial institutions. This has made intra-family borrowing and transfers important. First, intra-family transfers help to cope with poverty. It is one of the explanation of absence of widespread famine in quite a few NIS countries where more than half of population have incomes below poverty line. 26 The second important use of intra-family transfers is …nancing new business formation. As shown in [39] and [24] …nancial constraints are not binding for small businesses both in CEE and NIS. The only applicable explanation for this is that entrepreneurs can borrow small amounts in informal credit markets.
The importance of family networks in transition economies is suggested by their prominence in the socialist period. Informal activities were essential means for households to cope with the shortages associated with central planning and price controls. A key question for the transition is the capacity of these networks to survive, and to compensate for inadequate public transfers. 27 A study of worker households in Poland [14] found that transfers in 1987 functioned much like means-tested public transfers: they ‡owed from high to low income households, to large families, and to those experiencing illness. Transfers continued to play an important role post transition, but at a reduced level. Transfer levels fell compared with 1987. Thus the role of transfers in alleviating poverty was reduced. Similar results were obtained for Russia [13] .
Intra-family transfers play a second important role, in addition to alleviating poverty. Given the underdeveloped contractual environment, and its e¤ects on the …nancial system, investment in transition economies is typically self-…nanced. This has consequences for enterprises that we discuss elsewhere. For the creation of new enterprises, self-…nancing means, essentially, family …nancing. Hence, intra-family networks can be critical to the process of enterprise formation. An important conjecture to test is how important were these developed networks in Poland to the rapid rates of enterprise formation compared with countries farther 26 One should bear in mind that climate is worse in CEE and NIS than in other regions of the world. 27 One can also study the e¤ect of transfers on consumption smoothing in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. See [56] .
to the east.
Indeed, one can speculate that the reduced role for transfers in the posttransition period may be due to the fact that now there is an additional role for such wealth. The use of savings in new business formation may be the cause of the decline in transfers. In the pre-transition period there were very few outlets for investment. The key test would be to see whether there is a relationship between the reduced level of transfers and the rate of small business formation across the region.
Labor mobility
Labor mobility is crucial for reallocation of resources in transition economies. In general, labor mobility rates both in CEE and NIS have been lower than in OECD and especially in the US ( [6] and [57] ). On the other hand, there is a huge di¤erence between the two sub-regions. While CEE labor markets have been rather ‡exible, NIS economies have exhibited signi…cant labor hoarding and low job mobility. This di¤erence can be seen in data on intersectoral and interregional worker mobility as well as in data on gross job ‡ows. Table 1 shows that variation in regional unemployment rates is much larger in Russia than in CEE countries. Moreover, there is no convergence in regional unemployment rates over time in Russia. Table 2 presents indices of interregional job mobility in CEE and Russia. Again, job mobility is very low in Russia.
Our goal in this section is to explain why labor mobility is so low in NIS. We will compare returns to mobility and costs of switching jobs in CEE and NIS.
An important factor is the di¤erence in unemployment bene…ts. CEE countries tried to buy out political support and introduced rather generous unemployment bene…ts [21] . On the other hand, NIS governments have o¤ered rather low unemployment bene…ts; therefore it is not surprising that in these economies workers simply cannot a¤ord long unemployment spells. NIS workers prefer to search on the job which is of course less e¢cient.
A low level of unemployment bene…ts in NIS is not the whole story, however. The lower mobility in NIS economies is also explained by the legacies of the STE discussed above. Indeed, geographical concentration of industry makes job mobility related to geographical mobility. The only way to switch occupations for workers of a company town is to move to another town. This may be rather easy in the smaller countries of CEE, 28 but much harder in the NIS. 28 An amazing example of high mobility in CEE economy is the Albanian emigration. Table  3 presents some estimates of number of Albanian workers abroad. About a quarter of Albanian labor force works outside the country. The remittances they send home are as high as 40 per cent of Albanian GDP.
Indeed, distances between neighboring regions in Siberia are greater than those between CEE countries. Interregional mobility in Russia indeed involves moving rather than commuting. In addition to huge transportation costs, in a transition economy, moving involves high transaction costs. Workers are typically liquidity constrained, and housing markets are not well developed.
The liquidity constraints allow employers to attach workers to the enterprises through payment of wages in kind [22] . 29 Since moving costs are high, …rms can exploit workers and ensure that the option of moving to a prosperous region is not relevant for the wage determination process. The workers are paid their value on the local labor market which may be far below the wage they could have earned in other regions net of transportation costs associated with moving. The empirical analysis in [22] shows that workers that are paid in kind are indeed much less likely to move.
Another way to attach workers to enterprises is via wage arrears. Empirical evidence in [16] proves that empirical evidence on that wage arrears exist both in distressed and healthy …rms. Therefore the arrears may be a strategic instrument that …rms use to exploit workers' liquidity constraints. 30 The empirical analysis also reveals a coordination e¤ect: a …rm is more likely to have wage arrears if all other …rms in the region have wage arrears.
Why are the wage arrears so widespread in Russia and less present in CEE economies? Economic geography may be again an answer. There is no point in trying to attach workers in CEE: the costs of interregional mobility are rather low so even unskilled workers can save enough to move. Even in one of the poorest transition countries, Albania, hundreds of thousands of workers manage to move to neighboring countries, not regions. Also, within Russia, the attachment through in-kind wages and wage arrears occurs only in distant regions and company towns. Wage arrears and in-kind payments of wages are less common in large metropolitan areas.
The economic geography problems are aggravated by other factors. One is the inherited paternalistic structure of Soviet enterprise that provided its employees with social bene…ts such as healthcare, housing, kindergartens etc. In many towns social services are still provided by large …rms rather than by municipalities (see [49] and Table 5 ). This makes the lives of the unemployed even more miserable. Employees of new …rms' that have no inherited social assets also su¤er. Therefore attractiveness of moving from the old sector to de novo …rms is low even though the latter may provide higher salary. Workers prefer to diversify and hold two jobs: one with a safe low wage combined with social services in the old …rm and the 29 See Table 4 for evidence on the fact that that wages in kind are much more common in Russia than in other transition countries.
other a riskier high-pay but without access to good social services [28] . Certainly, multiple job holding makes geographical mobility even more costly. Instead of …nding a job in the new region, the worker has to …nd two jobs at the same time.
Human Capital Accumulation
A key characteristic of transition economies is that they start with relatively high levels of human capital. The literacy rates are often as high as those in OECD countries. A key question, however, is how suited this human capital is to economic transformation. The Soviet educational system put more emphasis on science and engineering rather than on marketing and entrepreneurship. This problem is present in all transitions economies. The pre-reform experience and skills may be irrelevant. In Romania, shops where managers had no prior experience in running the shop performed better than those where managers had such experience [53] .
The transition process increases the return to human capital accumulation. The stories about professors earning less than busdrivers are not revealing: wages were highly compressed under planning, and market forces leads to increased variation (see [48] ). The real problem in transition is with the supply of human capital. As we have noted, the existing supply may be inappropriate to the needs of the market. Potentially more important, is the impact of a …scal system under stress on the education system. It is not necessarily clear that the educational system that produced high levels of human capital under socialism can be maintained in the current environment. The implications of current …scal problems for the long-run growth in transition economies have yet to be studied.
Enterprise restructuring
The key challenge of transition is to increase the e¢ciency of resource use so that economic performance can be enhanced. There are three ways in which this takes place. First, an improved allocation of resources across uses depends on the creation of e¤ective markets for capital, labor, and resources. 31 Second, the existing enterprises can use resources more e¢ciently. This requires enterprise restructuring. Third, new …rm formation is critical to e¢ciency and growth. We consider new …rm creation below. In this section, our focus is on restructuring of existing enterprises.
There are two policy instruments that have been used in transition economies to improve enterprise e¢ciency. First, and most basic, is the elimination of softbudget constraints. Eliminating subsidies is critical to induce enterprises to act 31 See the companion paper [21] . more e¢ciently. Second, and more important, has been privatization of existing state-owned enterprises. In virtually all transition countries some form of privatization has occurred. Although the connection between privatization and improved e¢ciency appears straightforward theoretically, the evidence in fact is more complex.
We consider both of these issues in this section. Our concern is to understand what factors inhibit enterprise restructuring.
Soft budget constraints
In most transition economies formal subsidies have been eliminated [54] . Often, however, these have been replaced by informal subsidies. These take various forms, but they continue to place heavy burdens on cash-strapped governments.
The experience with transition has demonstrated that the elimination of soft budget constraints is much more complex than simply ending formal subsidies. Soft budget constraints may take di¤erent forms. These are tax arrears that are written o¤ or restructured, inter…rm arrears that are never paid and wage arrears. The percentage of bad loans has also been notorious. The most important form of subsidies, at least in the NIS is the continued delivery of low-cost energy. Enterprises do not pay the full cost of their energy use, and energy suppliers fall into tax arrears with the government.
The composition and the magnitude of soft budget constraints varies across region. They are apparently widespread in NIS, less so in Romania and Bulgaria and virtually gone in CEE [54] .
Why are the soft budget constraints so common in NIS and so rare in CEE? The most straightforward explanation is competition. If seller only sells to one buyer she keeps selling even if the buyer does not have enough cash to pay now. The same applies to workers. They lend their wages to their employer since there is no other employer in the town. The other explanation is political we address it in the Subsection 6.6.
Privatization and Restructuring
Disentangling the empirical relationship between privatization (ownership type) and enterprise restructuring is complex. We want to discern whether ownerhship type leads to greater restructuring. If we compare performance of privatized and state-owned enterprises we face a potential selection problem. Are privatized enterprises more productive because they are privatized, or were enterprises with better initial conditions more likely to be privatized.
Various studies have attempted to study the connection between privatization and restructuring 32 , trying to control for selection. In [52] the initial level of productivity is used to control for selection bias. 33 But this is works only to the extent that productivity is measured correctly. In [23] selection is controlled for by dropping enterprises purchased by insiders, which is e¤ective at controlling selection due to insider bias, but does not deal with other sources. 34 The evidence seems to indicate a stronger e¤ect of privatization on restructuring in CEE's than in the NIS. There also seems to be evidence that the more concentrated is private ownership the greater the amount of restructuring.
Corporate governance and enterprise …nance
The other problem with …rms' incentives is the con ‡ict of interests between managers and owners. The corporate governance environment has been very poor in transition economies. There were no joint stock companies before the reform started. All legal and market institutions were to be designed from the scratch. The transition countries had to re-introduce such things as rule-of-law, independent court system, stock markets, insurance etc. Since institutional memory in CEE is much better (there are still generations that lived under capitalism) than in NIS, the success in re-building these institutions was very di¤erent. Most NIS countries have adopted the relevant legislation that is the same or even better as in CEE or OECD. However the enforcement of the laws in NIS has been rather poor.
Managers use the imperfections of legal system to divert pro…ts. 35 The widespread use of transfer pricing and barter payments in Russia helps managers take the corporate pro…ts away from the company (often o¤shore) leaving outside investors with nothing. Under the present legal system it is very hard for minority shareholders to control management. Only when outside investors take over a 32 E.G., [17] , [52] , and [23] . 33 Because of the di¢culty in measuring capital services, [52] use energy use as a proxy. But this means that countries that enterprises that had not reduced energy use in transition will have higher "measured" capital services, and hence lower productivity growth. Hence, di¤erences across countries ( [52] uses pooled data for various economies) in energy prices can contaminate productivity measurements. 34 For example government decisions about which enterprises to privatize based on political decisions. 35 The absence of a managerial labor market at the onset of transition is an important factor in the incentive to divert income. Without managerial labor markets, incumbent managers have few ways of appropriating returns that may be due to their e¤orts, unless they manage to own a signi…cant block of shares. With privatization schemes that gave incumbent managers relatively small packets (compared to workers) the incentive to divert assets was larger than otherwise might have been. A managerial labor market allows incumbents to earn returns on any improvements they are responsible for, even if they do not own a large bloc of shares. For an early analysis of this issue, see [33] . quali…ed majority they can replace the manager (and therefore become insiders herself).
Good corporate governance also requires clearly de…ned bankruptcy procedures. Russia's recent bankruptcy experience shows however that a good bankruptcy law does not make things any better if there are no independent courts to enforce it [46] . In 1998, Russia has introduced a long overdue bankruptcy law. The law was praised by many as su¢ciently tough on managers giving creditors a good chance to get their money back. After the inception of the law, the number of bankruptcies …lings has indeed skyrocketed. The creditors (including federal government) however have not received much. The judges e¤ectively controlled by regional governments often ruled in the favor of incumbant managers.
As argued by [2] corporate governance in transition economies is developing in the direction of German-Japanese model rather than the Anglo-Saxon one. Small investors cannot get any return. Only large shareholders can assure some income. This makes the stock market very thin and makes reallocation of capital quite costly. Therefore …rms that contemplate restructure cannot easily …nd external sources of …nance. On the other hand, until they restructure they do not have enough pro…ts to re-invest.
Role of competition and openness
Competition is an important contributor to improved economic performance. Competition can come from two sources: the internal market, and increased openness to foreign competition. Empirical evidence suggests that competition improves e¢ciency, though the e¤ect appears to be non-linear. More competition is good, but too much inhibits restructuring. 36 The latter result is no doubt due to the importance of internally generated resources for investment.
The extent to which enterprises face competition is correlated with ownership types. Privatized enterprises (and new entrants) are much more likely to face competition than state-owned enterprises [17, 136] . There are perhaps two reasons for this. First, state-owned enterprises may perceive less competition because they receive state protection. New entry may be more di¢cult in enterprises dominated by large state-owned enterprises. Second, and more important, the nature of privatization programs themselves may be responsible. Those enterprises left in state hands tended to be in less competitive sectors of the economy. 37 Even if …rms maximized pro…ts, the lack of competition and openness would prevent the economy from achieving the e¢cient outcome. The Soviet industrial- 36 See the [17] , p.132. This e¤ect was …rst analyzed by [34] . 37 This is one of the factors which makes it so di¢cult to estimate the e¢ciency-enhancing e¤ect of privatization: selection bias created by privatization. ization model has created highly specialized …rms so that they could not easily …nd new partners (see [5] and [43] for theory and evidence on disorganization). Within the country each …rm virtually had one potential buyer. Therefore openness of the economy became really crucial. Firms that could compete in the export markets had much higher returns to restructuring. The di¤erence between performance of exporting and non-exporting industries in the transition economies is striking. In Russia, industrial output declined by about a half in 1991-98. The decline in the oil industry was only 10 per cent. The same dichotomy occurred in CEE. In Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia the sectors that were exporting to the West experienced a little decline or even growth while those oriented on sales within CMEA declined signi…cantly [58] . Since on average, CEE economies were less specialized and geographically closer to the Western Europe, they found it easier to compete in the export market. 38 Lack of access to foreign markets may be considered a temporary barrier. If a …rm were able to borrow and invest in building competitive production lines they would be able to restructure. The corporate governance problems however leave the CIS …rms liquidity constrained. The only way to …nance restructuring is to reinvest pro…ts. The pro…ts however are low precisely because of lack of access to export markets.
Do managers have incentives to become more competitive? In CEE, the forthcoming EU accession exerts a strong external pressure. The fact that CEE countries are joining EU in the foreseeable future while NIS countries are not, provides CEE managers with extra incentives to restructure. Things are rather di¤erent in NIS economies. Managers choose whether to invest their human capital in restructuring or into enhancement of relationship capital which is useful for running a …rm in the no-restructuring equilibrium [26] , [29] . 39 The latter may reduce costs of barter and ensure political clout. If the …rm is far from export markets, the manager chooses to invest in relationship capital rather than restructuring. 40 The post-1998-devaluation experience of Russian industry corroborates the importance of openness. In August 1998, real exchange rate of ruble fell approximately by half giving Russian …rms a unique chance for competing in the export markets and in domestic markets previously dominated by imports. Russian …rms 38 Another issue is EU accession. The fact that CEE countries are joining EU in the foreseeable future while NIS countries are not, provides CEE managers with extra incentives to care about their competitiveness in the global economy. 39 This is an example of ill-suited human capital. The relationship capital is good for survival without restructuring but does not help to operate e¢ciently. 40 This theory is somewhat similar to management entrenchment literature, in particular to [18] . E¤ectively, it is an endogenous noise model: manager chooses barter that creates additional confusion. Since more confusion means less control by the outside stakeholders, it is chosen by manager even if ine¢cient. did take advantage of this opportunity not only increasing sales at unprecedented rates but also using some of the revenues for structural changes. For the …rst time since 1991, the share of barter in inter…rm transactions showed a clear tendency to decline. It is too early to judge yet whether the vicious circle of survival-withoutrestructuring has been broken.
Contractual imperfections
Underdevelopment of legal institutions imposes a heavy burden on transition economies. High level of asset speci…city inherited from STE requires enforcement of sophisticated contracts. As mentioned above, in most transition countries, legislation allows to write all kinds of contracts but the court system fails to enforce them. This is especially common in NIS (see [24] and [38] ). In CEE countries courts do not work perfectly but are indeed used in con ‡ict resolution. In NIS, …rms do not believe that courts can enforce contracts.
There are a few alternative solutions to the problem. In [38] , widespread use of relational contracting is reported. Contract enforcement via organized crime is also very common among small businesses. Payments in kind can be used as hostage in contract relationships to mitigate the hold-up problem [47] .
The mainstream incomplete contract theory [30] suggests that vertical integration may also help to overcome contractual imperfections. Indeed, vertical integration is very common. Only registered vertically integrated groups employ 2% of labor force in Russia with unregistered vertical groups being at least as important [11] . Vertically integrated …rms are predominant in such industries as oil extraction and processing, natural gas, steel production, cars etc. Controlling for other factors vertical integration does help to increase labor productivity [9] .
Although organized crime, barter and vertical integration reduce transaction costs of relation-speci…c investment, these solutions are not at all innocent. Organized crime has a strong negative e¤ect on small business development. Barter is very costly for corporate governance and tax collection. Vertical integration forecloses markets (see Table 6 for empirical evidence on Russian product markets).
Enterprise-government interaction
One of the key barriers to restructuring is political pressure. Since restructuring results in (at least temporary) increase in the number of unemployed both federal and local government are reluctant to make it happen. The simple model in [55] describes the nature of bargaining between politicians and …rms. Politicians are interested in full employment. Managers would like to restructure and get rid of burden of excess labor but they are compensated by explicit or implicit subsidies from the politicians.
Another problem with local government is that local politicians may not be at all interested in geographical mobility. Local authorities in depressed company towns are not willing to let skilled workers leave for other more prosperous regions since this would decrease the average income of local population. Therefore there is no surprise that local authorities are quite happy to see social assets (hospitals, kindergartens, housing, recreation facilities) to be run by …rms. As we argued above …rms may use the social assets as a means of attaching workers which is perfectly aligned with local politicians' interests.
On the other hand, local governments in prosperous communities that represent incumbent workers are not happy to see incoming skilled labor since it would drop the wages and therefore welfare of median voter. Hence all the administrative barriers to geographical mobility. The only party that is not represented in the political process are the skilled workers who want to move. Their interests are in theory protected by the federal government that should disburse targeted bene…ts to encourage mobility. The cash-strapped budget however does not allow to set these bene…ts at any reasonable level.
New …rm creation
Small business development is an important aspect of economic transition at least in two respects. First, the legacies of the STE leave huge market niches especially in services. By …lling these niches, small business can signi…cantly improve welfare. Moreover, the new …rms are not burdened by the past; they are much more likely to follow market-like practices. It is not surprising, then, that in many CEE countries, small business formation has indeed become a key engine of growth.
Second, small business provides an income source for workers that are laid o¤ in the process of restructuring. If more restructuring results in greater unemployment, and if this causes higher taxes to support the unemployed, the economy can end up in a …scal trap. [1] Self-employment can thus act as a safety valve that prevents this trap from emerging. The social cost of restructuring is greater when self-employment is less common, and therefore the political pressure to delay restructuring increases.
The rates of small business formation varies a lot across countries. Since pre-reform distortions were higher in the NIS than in CEE, the potential for small business growth should have been higher in the NIS. This potential has not materialized: the number of small business per capita in Poland is almost ten times as high as in Russia. 41 In this Section we will try to analyze an entrepreneur's 41 Many small …rms are just dummies registered for tax avoidance purposes. Given Russia's larger uno¢cial economy [37] , one could assume that the share of tax dummies among small …rms is greater in Russia than in Poland. Therefore, the di¤erence is, almost certainly, even decision to start up and invest in a small business in a transition country and compare environment of small business in CEE and NIS.
There are several potential barriers for small businesses. First, given the level of …nancial development in the transition, small businesses may face …nancial constraints. Second, there could be tough competition from other small businesses. All the pro…table niches have already been taken and it is hard to get high pro…t margins. Third, there may be predatory behavior of government and/or private rackets.
Surprisingly, the empirical evidence indicates that …nancial constraints are not critical either in CEE or in NIS. A large survey of small manufacturing …rms in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine [39] shows that access to credit does not a¤ect investment. Studies of shops in Moscow and Warsaw [24] also suggest that shopkeepers do not perceive …nance to be a major problem. The niches for small businesses are so huge that the …rms that do get through are able to earn enough pro…t to support business growth.
There is a clear dichotomy between CEE and NIS in terms of competition and government predation. In the CEE, competition has already become an important constraint. Unlike their counterparts in Moscow, shopkeepers in Poland name competition as their major concern [25] . 42 In the NIS, the major problem is predation. Small businesses are taxed and regulated at exorbitant rates. In order to survive they hide some or all of their revenues and become part of the uno¢cial economy. Once in the uno¢cial economy, the …rm cannot is prevented from seeking contract enforcement and protection from the state. These services are provided by corrupt bureaucrats and organized crime who extract most of the monopoly rents in exchange [38] , [40] . In the CEE (inclusive of Romania and Bulgaria) small …rms report that their major concern is competition while neither government nor private rackets are an important problem. In the NIS, …rms do not grow large enough to …ll out all the niches; hence competition is much less intense and monopoly rents correspondingly higher. These rents are an attraction to predators, whether public or private. Hence, di¤erences in the extent of competition (and openness) may explain some of the di¤erence in the degree of predation.
The clear-cut dichotomy helps to explain why small business performance is so di¤erent in the CEE and NIS. In a competitive world, investment that reduces marginal cost is pro…table and therefore will be undertaken. In a predation model, however, the fruits of the investment will be expropriated by rent-seekers. Also, investment and growth make the …rm more visible, less mobile and therefore more striking. 42 Although these results di¤er from what is reported in the survey results reported by the EBRD [17] . subject to more bribe extortion.
This may explain another stylized fact. Controlling for the …rms' lifecycle, [42] …nds that small businesses in CEE are more e¢cient than the large …rms. This is despite the fact that at the start of transition the opposite was true. 43 In the NIS, however, there is no signi…cant di¤erence in performance.
Notice that the dividing line with respect to the small business environment lies to the east of Bulgaria and Romania. From a small businessman's point of view, Romania and Bulgaria (as well as the Baltic States) are closer to the Visegrad countries than to the NIS (see Table 7 for a comparison of Romania to Poland and Russia).
Apart from government predation, the development of small business is slowed down by a number of economies of scale that are present in the NIS countries. One is due to the peculiar institution of barter that has ‡ourished in Russia and to a lesser extent in the other NIS economies. For a large …rm, the transaction costs of barter may be very little relative to other costs, since the more diversi…ed the …rm is the easier it is to solve the problem of double-coincidence-of-wants. On the other hand, a small single-product entrepreneur cannot a¤ord to hire a barter broker, nor to spend her own time searching for appropriate barter exchanges. Therefore thin monetary markets and thick barter ones bene…t large …rms and hurt smaller ones. In addition, barter is more common in enterprises with historical relations which again presents a bias against new enterprises [35] .
Another source of increasing returns is the social asset ownership. As we mentioned above, a large share of social assets still belongs to large …rms who use them strategically for attaching their workers. The quality of municipal social services is much lower. Therefore the employees of small …rms that cannot a¤ord running their own hospitals or kindergartens have to be compensated for being deprived of the higher quality social services.
Political economy is also important. Since the number of small businesses in the NIS is still very low, politicians pay greater attention to the interests of large …rms. Therefore most subsidies and tax breaks tend to go to large enterprises. The regional governments often intervene in bankruptcy procedures in order to prevent the big …rms from liquidation while they do not care about the small …rms.
Conclusions
Although CEE and NIS countries have begun their transition to market approximately at the same time, their growth performance has been strikingly di¤erent.
We have discussed possible microeconomic explanations of this di¤erence. The failures of NIS economies can be explained by legacies of the Soviet growth models which hampered development of market institutions and therefore limited labor mobility, new …rm formation and restructuring of existing …rms. In particular, lack of openness and competition combined with imperfection of political and legal system have given rise to a vicious circle of resistance to reform. Workers cannot easily move. Even privatization does not provide existing …rms with incentives to restructure. New …rms are not established or even if established do not grow as fast as they could.
Romania and Bulgaria whose growth performance has been in between NIS and Visegrad seem to be an intermediate case from the microeconomic point of view, too. In Romania and Bulgaria, enterprise restructuring has been rather slow making them similar to NIS. On the other hand, the rates of small business development are rather close to those in Visegrad countries.
Appendix: Tables. Table 6 . OLS regression for entry rates in Russian product markets. Vshare is the share of vertically integrated firms in market, MES is minimum efficiency scale, CR1 is the market share of the largest firm in the market, growth is the growth rate. 
